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Paper   IPM / Philosophy / 9485
School of Analytic Philosophy
  Title:   Radical Interpretation and Moore's Paradox
  Author(s):  H. Vahid
  Status:   Published
  Journal: Theoria
  Vol.:  74
  Year:  2008
  Pages:   146-163
  Supported by:  IPM
Moore's sentences of the form "P and  I believe that P" and "P and I believe that  P" are thought to be paradoxical because they cannot be properly asserted despite being possibly true. Solutions to the paradox usually explain the oddity of such sentences in terms of phenomena as diverse as the pragmatics of speech acts, nature of belief or justification. In this paper I shall argue that despite their seemingly different approaches to the problem, there is a single strategy that underlies all such proposals. Having criticized these suggestions, I shall defend my own solution according to which Moorean sentences are defective not because of some associated logical impropriety but because their assertion violates a certain interpretive constraint, viz., the principle of charity, on an adequate theory of meaning.

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