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Paper   IPM / Philosophy / 17058
School of Analytic Philosophy
  Title:   Intention, Judgement-Dependence and Self-Deception
  Author(s):  Ali Hossein Khani
  Status:   Published
  Journal: Res Philosophica
  No.:  2
  Vol.:  100
  Year:  2023
  Pages:   203-226
  Supported by:  IPM
Wright's judgement-dependent account of intention is an attempt to show that truths about a subject's intentions can be viewed as constituted by the subject's own best judgements about those intentions. The judgements are considered to be best if they are formed under certain cognitively optimal conditions, which mainly include the subject's conceptual competence, attentiveness to the questions about what the intentions are, and lack of any material self-deception. Offering a substantive, non-trivial specification of the no-self-deception condition is one of the main problems for Wright. His solution is to view it as a positive presumption, which is violated only if there is strong evidence to the effect that the subject is self-deceived. In this paper, I will argue that the concern about self-deception in Wright's account is misplaced and generally unmotivated.

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