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Paper   IPM / Philosophy / 14961
School of Analytic Philosophy
  Title:   Why emotion recognition is not simulational
  Author(s):  Ali Yousefi Heris
  Status:   Published
  Journal: Philosophical Psychology
  No.:  6
  Vol.:  30
  Year:  2017
  Pages:   711-730
  Supported by:  IPM
According to a dominant interpretation of the simulation hypothesis, in recognizing an emotion we use the same neural processes used in experiencing that emotion. This paper argues that the view is fundam entally misguided. I will examine the simulational arguments for the three basic emotions of fear, disgust, and anger and argue that the simulational account relies strongly on a narrow sense of emotion processing which hardly squares with evidence on how, in fact, emotion recognition is processed. I contend that the current body of empirical evidence suggests that emotion recognition is processed in an integrative system involving multiple cross-regional interactions in the brain, a view which squares with understanding emotion recognition as an information-rich, rather than simulational, process. In the final section, I discuss possible objections.

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