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|Paper IPM / Philosophy / 11602||
It is widely believed that what distinguishes between a justifiable and a justified belief is the obtaining of an epistemic relation, the basing relation, whose nature and character has long been a controversial issue in epistemology. There are currently two major approaches to the problem of the basing relation, namely, the causal and doxastic theories. In this paper, after a brief survey of the field, I examine Alston's recent account of the basing relation, as input to psychologically realized functions, arguing that his way of identifying the functions in question presupposes what it seeks to establish as it merely replaces one kind of indeterminacy (with respect to the ground of a belief ) with another (regarding the content of belief outputs). To avoid this problem, I suggest a version of Alston's account within a broadly Davidsonian framework.
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