The benefits and limitations of taking a cognitive perspective on self-control conflicts
27 JAN 2020
14:00 - 16:00
Self-control conflicts are a ubiquitous part of our daily lives. Over the last years, research on self-control has benefitted from applying insights on response conflicts produced by research in cognitive psychology. This approach is useful, because it combines the strength of the cognitive approach (experimental control) with the strength of the self-control context (ecological validity). It is also fitting, given that self-control conflicts share several basic features with response conflicts typically studied in distractor interference (e.g., Stroop) tasks: people need to engage control processes to inhibit or override a pre-potent, automatic response in order to act in line with a higher-order (task) goal. In this talk, I will argue that despite its benefits, this approach is currently limited, because it focuses predominantly on the similarities between the two types of conflict. What has received very little attention until now is that both types of conflict also differ in important ways. I will introduce two lines of research that address two specific differences (e.g., the to-be-inhibited response in a self-control conflict is always motivationally charged) and show that those differences matter. Finally, I will elaborate on how this work contributes to the cognitive control as well as the self-control literature.
School of Cognitive Sciences, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM),
Opposite the ARAJ, Artesh Highway, Tehran, Iran on map
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